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What Should be the Agenda of a
Presidential Commission to Study the
lfnternational Application of U.S.
Antitrust Law?
Douglas E. Rosenthal*
If the proposed Presidential Commission to study the Interna-
tional Application of the U.S. Antitrust Law (Commission)' is to com-
plete its work within the one year period contemplated and is to
achieve more than a superficial gloss of a large and complex area, I
believe it will be necessary for the Commission to concentrate its atten-
tion on the conflicts between the four important goals of foreign eco-
nomic policy.
The first of these goals is the promotion of open and competitive
markets for both imports and exports. The second is the maintenance
of amicable diplomatic relationships with the nations with whom we
trade. The third is the assistance of American workers and enterprises
when they suffer sudden, substantial, and sometimes unfair, but reme-
diable hardship in international competition. The fourth goal-no less
important for being only recently recognized-is the facilitation of ex-
port opportunities for U.S. goods and services.
The first goal is embodied in our antitrust laws, which represent
not only rules for proper conduct in the marketplace, but also an ex-
Partner, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan,Washington, D.C. Formerly Chief of the Foreign
Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice. This article expands upon a
statement published in 126 CONG. Rmc. S 11,773-74 (daily ed. August 27, 1980).
1 The Commission will be established by the Commission on the International Application of
the United States Antitrust Laws Act, which was denoted as S.1010 on the Senate side. For the
text of the bill as it was passed by that chamber, see 126 CONG. REC. S13,814-15 (daily ed. Sept.
30, 1980).
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pression of America's commitment to a system of economic freedom.2
The second goal is reflected in our diplomatic policy, that is, in our
commitment to resolve disputes with other nations with due regard for
the fact that not every sovereign people approves of all of our rather
idiosyncratic legal institutions or accepts the validity of our laws-es-
pecially our laws of economic ordering.3 The third goal is embodied in
our trade laws which attempt to delineate the sometimes necessary de-
partures from free market principles. The final goal will be advanced
by pending legislation seeking to reduce, if not eliminate existing or
perceived impediments to the aggressive marketing of U.S. exports.4
It is becoming increasingly apparent that these goals may conflict
in particular policy applications. The primary task of the Presidential
Commission should be to consider the apparent conflicts between the
first goal-that of maintaining and increasing the competitiveness of
international markets-and each of the other three goals.5 To the ex-
tent that significant conflicts are deemed to exist, the Commission
should recommend practical compromises that will, to the fullest extent
possible, express a continuing commitment to and preservation of all
four goals of U.S. foreign economic policy. The Commission should
also be committed to fostering free markets; to seeking accommoda-
tions with our trading partners; to assisting those Americans injured in
the international marketplace when they have been significantly vic-
timized by unfair foreign practices or when temporary relief from for-
2 Free enterprise is fundamental to American society, and American businesses are subject to
far fewer controls than many "of their foreign counterparts. Some government regulation is neces-
sary, however, to ensure that entrepreneurial freedom is not constrained by private activities. As
Justice Marshall said: "Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the
Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental per-
sonal freedoms." United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
3 In any ordering of America's economic regulatory goals, the maintenance of competition
must come first. As was said by Commissioner Eleanor M. Fox, with regard to the National
Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures: "Our general approach was as
follows: we expressed our belief that 'free market competition, protected by the antitrust laws,
should continue to be the general organizing principle for our economy.' We would make excep-
tions from the competition principle only in the case of 'compelling evidence of the unworkability
of competition or a clearly paramount social purpose.'" Antitrust and Foreign Export Cartels: The
National Commission Review of the Webb-Pomerene Exemption, 12 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 59,
60 (1979) (introductory letter by Eleanor M. Fox).
4 The most important pending legislation is the Export Trading Companies Act of 1980,
S.2718, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. S 11,935 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1980), which passed the
Senate unanimously on September 3, 1980. The House version of the Act, which was introduced
May 1, 1980 as H.R.7230, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., has been reported on and recommended for pas-
sage. H.R. REP. No. 1151, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). See generally Cole, Establishing.4merican
Trading Companies, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 277 (1980).
5 Section 3(b) of S.1010 states that the Commission shall study:
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eign competition can yield a higher degree of long-term U.S.
competitiveness; and to the facilitation of U.S. exports. This exercise
need not produce a fundamental reconstitution of U.S. policy or insti-
tutions. However, where sharp conflicts between two desirable objec-
tives appear unavoidable, the precise nature and extent of such
conflicts should be laid out so that further executive, legislative and
judicial action may be considered.
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND
DIPLOMATIC POLICY
The most important conflict is between the effective enforcement
of U.S. antitrust law and the maintenance of amicable relations with
our trading partners, especially our closest and most important allies.
The jurisdiction of U.S. antitrust law is broader than that of every other
nation in the world, save perhaps the Federal Republic of Germany.6
(1) the application of the United States antitrust laws in foreign commerce, and their
effect on-
(A) the ability of United States enterprises to compete effectively abroad; and
(B) the ability of United States enterprises to compete or deal effectively with foreign
controlled or assisted enterprises in market and nonmarket economies;
(2) the effect of the application of the United States antitrust laws on United States
relations with other countries;
(3) the jurisdiction and scope of the application of the antitrust laws to foreign conduct
and foreign parties;
(4) the issue of reciprocity between nations with respect to mutual access to markets,
equal opportunities for foreign investment, and enforcement of antitrust laws;
(5) the proper scope and effect of the following on the application of the United States
antitrust laws:
(A) the rules governing sovereign immunity;
(B) the act of state doctrine;
(C) the defense of "foreign sovereign compulsion"; and
(D) the doctrine of comity;
(6) the application of United States rules of court relating to the enforcement of anti-
trust laws in the context of international transactions (for example, the "per se" and "rule of
reason" doctrines); and
(7) the application of the United States antitrust laws to joint ventures, mergers, acqui-
sitions, and distribution and licensing arrangements between and among the United States
and foreign or foreign-based enterprises.
126 CONG. REC. S13,815 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980). Most of these topics will necessarily be ad-
dressed even by the narrow focus advocated by this article. Sovereign immunity may fall beyond
the proper scope of the Commission's inquiry, however, because it is not a doctrine of particular
controversy relative to antitrust. Most informed observers would agree that if a foreign sovereign
state, acting for itself, engages in public anticompetitive conduct, it is and should be immune from
prosecution in foreign courts. It is true that there is an important exception to this general rule-
where a state is engaged in essentially commercial activities for a commercial purpose, in which
case it may be subject to the jurisdiction of our courts as provided for in the commercial activities
exception in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976). The legal
scholar could hypothesize several potential problems in distinguishing commercial from political
activity. The problems that arise here, however, are less urgent than other, more fundamental
issues.
6 Art. 98(2) of the German antitrust statute specifically makes its provisions applicable to "all
374
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U.S. antitrust investigations also involve procedures which contradict
foreign ideas of fairness.7 What we in the U.S. accomplish through
legal proceedings between private persons, other nations--even those
with our common law heritage-accomplish only through diplomacy.
These differences are drawing us into increasingly serious international
economic confrontations.8 The Commission should seek ways to re-
duce these confrontations without unraveling the fabric of U.S. anti-
trust enforcement.
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Effects Doctrine
The U.S. today is virtually alone in granting domestic courts the
jurisdiction to adjudicate extraterritorial private conduct by foreign
persons that has a direct and substantial adverse effect on competition
within the U.S. 9 This view of the appropriate reach of our law is a
venerable one, dating from the Sherman Act,'" passed 90 years ago,
and first applied by the Supreme Court more than 70 years ago."
There is no question that in appropriate circumstances the U.S. courts
should continue to exercise jurisdiction consistently with this so-called
"effects doctrine."' 2 In a world of increasing interdependency, the nul-
restraints of competition which have effect within the territory to which this Law applies, even if
they are caused from outside the territory to which this Law applies." Act Against Restraints of
Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen), [1957] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI], I
1080, as republished [1974] BGBI I 869, amended [1976] BGBI 1917.
7 The Commission will find that:
Difficulties arise where broad claims of jurisdiction coincide with material variations in sub-
stantive law. . . . [T]he very widest claims of jurisdiction have been made by the United
States, which, generally speaking, are not matched by corresponding claims by other coun-
tries, and at the same time there are widely differing views from one country to another on
what conduct is reprehensible ....
Willougby, Remarks by an English Solicitor in PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLI-
CATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS 56, 58 (1979).
8 One should especially note Britain's retaliation in the form of the Protection of Trading
Interests Act, 1980, c.l I. See generally, Note, The Protection of Trading Interests Act. Britain's
Response to U.S. Extraterritorial4ntitrust Enforcement, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 476 (1980). A
similar Canadian bill, introduced on July 11, 1980, is expected to pass. Canadian Legislation
Would Stymie Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Judgments, 973 ANTITRUST TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA), at A-19 (July 17, 1980).
9 See Lever, Aspects of Jurisdictional Conflict in the Field of Discovery, in INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST, FIFTH ANNUAL FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 358, 378 (1979).
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1973).
11 The case of United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911), was commenced
on July 19, 1907.
12 The use of the effects doctrine is most clearly appropriate in those situations where: (a) the
foreign conduct damages domestic competitors or consumers; or (b) the foreign enterprise is freely
operating in a manner forbidden to domestic enterprises. By way of illustration, suppose that four
European pharmaceutical houses each with sales agencies in two U.S. cities, produce in Europe
the only significant quantities of a heart medicine widely prescribed in the United States. Further
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lification of such jurisdiction would cede to those foreign interests so
inclined the opportunity to have an anticompetitive extraterritorial im-
pact within U.S. borders, regardless of the clarity of the anticompetitive
intent, the harm caused, the importance of the U.S. economic policies
thereby undermined, or the contacts of those persons with U.S. domes-
tic commerce. It would also open a loophole permitting U.S. multina-
tional corporations to encourage their foreign subsidiaries to do what
U.S. domestic corporations would be forbidden from doing.
Therefore, the critical inquiry for the Commission is not whether
effects jurisdiction should be nullified, but whether in some situations
its exercise is inappropriate. The most difficult and most important
problem is whether U.S. antitrust jurisdiction should be exercised over
extraterritorial acts that are incompatible with U.S. antitrust law and
policy, but are nonetheless consistent with and in furtherance of the
law or economic policy of a foreign sovereign. Until now, as most re-
cently reflected in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation,3 U.S. federal
courts have been relatively unconcerned as to whether the enforcement
of U.S. antitrust laws undermines the sovereign policies of foreign gov-
ernments. The one exception has been where a U.S. antitrust defend-
ant can demonstrate that its anticompetitive conduct abroad was
strictly and literally compelled by the foreign sovereign.14
The doctrine of foreign sovereign compulsion demands review.
One of the main problems with the foreign sovereign compulsion doc-
trine as presently enunciated is that it fails to account for the un-
doubted fact that many foreign sovereigns-and the U.S. itself in other
legal areas-often have absolutely vital legal and policy interests,
strongly expressed within their jurisdiction, yet not absolutely com-
pelled. For example, the British, Australian and Canadian defendants
which defaulted in the Uranium litigation, supra, had a motive to do so
that was grounded in their own national laws relating to the enforce-
ment of judgments. It is arguable that under their laws any appearance
before the U.S. court, even if only to challenge the court's jurisdiction,
would enable the plaintiff to enforce a money judgment against the
defendants if the plaintiff ultimately prevailed. Since these defendants
were not compelled by their national laws to avoid the jurisdiction of
the U.S. court, the U.S. judge was quite unresponsive to this argument.
suppose that they jointly agree to raise prices by 50% thereby pricing many impoverished senior
citizens with heart disease out of the market. This would be a clear case for use of the effects
doctrine.
13 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
14 The doctrine of foreign sovereign compulsion is most clearly stated in United States v.
Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Center, Inc., [1963] Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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The court held the defendants in default and was prepared to hold a
prompt hearing on the damages resulting from their alleged miscon-
duct, even before the question of jurisdiction and liability against the
non-defaulting defendants was litigated. 5 This example suggests an
ethnocentric arrogance in the overriding application of U.S. law as if
our idiosyncratic ideas of antitrust were universally accepted by foreign
nations.
I would like to see the Commission give serious consideration to
the development of choice-of-law principles that can be applied by
U.S. courts in an international conflict-of-law situation. These princi-
ples may be analogous to the principles applied by the state courts
within our federal system. I believe that it is possible, and that it may
well be a major improvement under the existing state of affairs for U.S.
courts to develop criteria that could indicate when it is inappropriate to
apply U.S. antitrust law to international activities. These criteria
should demonstrate at what point the policy interests of, and the legal
contacts with the foreign sovereign are weightier than the interests of
the U.S. in deterring anticompetitive conduct having an admittedly
more remote contact with our territory and institutions. 6 Such a bal-
ancing would be no different than that done by U.S. state courts in
determining whether the law of a foreign state is more properly appli-
cable to a dispute than the law of the forum state.
Evidentiary Discovery Across International Borders
In addition to the question of jurisdiction, the Commission should
give particular attention to another problem of extraterritorial conffict,
namely, the lack of international standards for evidentiary discovery.
The scope of permissible discovery in the U.S. is far broader than that
of any other developed legal system in the world."7 Since there is no
international mechanism for resolving disputes as to the appropriate
breadth of national discovery, the Commission should consider what
could be done to lessen the clash between what our courts require to be
disclosed and what foreign courts deem an inappropriate inquiry.
Is In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F. Supp. 382 (1978).
16 One possible precedent for such an approach is the case of Lauritzen v. Larson, 345 U.S.
571 (1953).
17 "[The] Federal Rules of Civil Procedure... give wide powers, wider than exist in En-
gland, of pre-trial discovery against persons not parties to a suit." Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. West-
inghouse, [1978] 1 All E.R. 434, 441. See Rahl, Enforcement and Dirco very Conflicts: A Viewfrom
the United States, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST, FIFTH ANNUAL FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW
INSTITUTE 343, 346-47 (1979).
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Private Suits, Treble Damages, and Foreign Commerce
A third important aspect of the "extraterritoriality problem" is the
potential mischief that can be caused byprivate antitrust treble damage
lawsuits in foreign commerce. In such a situation, the U.S. is not a
party, and there is no person with sufficient expertise to determine the
relationship between the rulings sought and the foreign policy interests,
practices and standards of the U.S. Executive Branch in its dealings
v with the implicated foreign sovereign. At the present time, no other
developed nation has an actively functioning private right of antitrust
action. Other nations are more aware than we that "private antitrust
disputes" may involve significant issues of national economic policy
and therefore, international diplomacy. They find it appalling that in-
expert and sometimes ethnocentric district court judges should possess
the apparent power to decide fundamental issues of economic diplo-
macy without regard to the foreign policy of the U.S. Executive
Branch. As many have noted, the private treble damage remedy, both
domestically and internationally, has been greatly abused. 8 This is
one problem requiring the Commission's particularly urgent attention.
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND COMPETITIVE
EXPORT MARKETING
Many American business executives perceive that the antitrust
laws discourage aggressive export marketing-especially the exporting
that would be enhanced by joint ventures among competitors. Do the
antitrust laws discourage such aggressive marketing? If so, is it appro-
priate that they do so? If it is not appropriate, and if there is indeed a
problem, how can these laws be modified so that they will not disad-
vantage American exporters?
The Sherman Act states that contracts, conspiracies and monopo-
lies in restraint of trade or commerce with foreign nations are subject to
the jurisdiction of United States federal courts. 9 The legislative his-
tory of the Sherman Act, however, is silent as to whether that jurisdic-
tion is to apply even as to restraints which have no adverse impact
either in United States markets, or on enterprises engaged in export
from the United States. Neither has this issue ever been addressed by
18 See generally Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Effciency: The Uneasy
Casefor Treble Damages, 17 J.L. & ECON. 329 (1974); Ferber, The Effectiveness of the Private
Treble Damages Action as an Antitrust Enforcement Mechanism, 8 Sw. U.L. REv. 505 (1976);
Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions." Do They Work?, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1319 (1973).
19 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 4 (1973).
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the Supreme Court. The Commission should consider amending the
Sherman Act to clarify and finally resolve this question.
Joint Ventures
Most antitrust scholars have concluded that a joint venture among
all the firms in a U.S. industry to build a dam only affecting the people
of a foreign nation would not be a violation of the Sherman Act, even
were such a combination illegal if undertaken within United States ter-
ritory. For the moment, the Justice Department has agreed. A consor-
tium of firms, including General Electric, Allis-Chalmers and Westing-
house, sought to bid on the construction of a Latin American hydro-
electric power project, and in a 1976 favorable business review, the Jus-
tice Department granted clearance.2" Later, in the Antitrust Guide for
International Operations, the Department endorsed this review as a
general enforcement policy.2'
Nevertheless, a few commentators, most notably Professor James
Rahl of Northwestern Law School, have argued that Sherman Act
subject-matter jurisdiction applies to any restraints on competition in
U.S. export trade, regardless of whether those restraints have any direct
or substantial adverse effect on U.S. markets or U.S. export competi-
tors. Rahl would then consider the competitive effect either on U.S.
persons, or in U.S. markets before determining whether there had been
a violation.2" While Rahl would apply an effects test as the second in a
two-step analysis, others could read the Sherman Act literally to apply
even absent an anticompetitive effect, concluding that the first step is
sufficient for determining liability.
It is therefore understandable that some businessmen are inhibited
from engaging in joint ventures involving the export of capital, services
or goods, since there has never been a more authoritative resolution of
this issue than the current enforcement policy of the Department of
Justice. Attorneys General change. Neither the present nor future At-
torneys General are bound by the view of the law articulated in 1977.
Thus, American joint venturers remain vulnerable to legal attack.
The impermanence of the Justice Department's enforcement phi-
20 763 ANTITRUST TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at A-14 (May 11, 1976). Authority for, and the
format of the business review procedures employed by the Antitrust Division of the Justice De-
partment may be found at 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1979).
21 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVIsION, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS 19 (1977) (Case C, at 19-22, deals with joint bidding).
22 See, e.g., Rahl, American Antitrust and Foreign Operations: What Is Covered?, 8 CORNELL
INT'L L.J 1, 6-8 (1974). This same issue over the reading of the Sherman Act may also arise over
the reading of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1973).
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losophy is demonstrated by a case brought by the Department 30 years
ago-the Minnesota Mining Case.23 There, the Department of Justice
sought and obtained a holding that a joint venture by American manu-
facturers, controlling four-fifths of the United States export trade in
coated abrasives, was a combination in restraint of U.S. foreign trade.24
The companies jointly owned factories abroad from which they sold
exclusively into foreign markets .2  This foreign manufacturing and
sales joint venture enabled them to earn greater profits than if they had
tried to export from the United States, and yielded an improved U.S.
balance of payments.26 The most objectionable part of the arrange-
ment was the agreement to jointly restrain exports as a precondition to
undertaking the overseas production. This "restraint," however, led to
no apparent injury to any export competitor and led to no apparent
restraint on competition in U.S. domestic markets. It is difficult, per-
haps impossible, to square this holding with the Department of Jus-
tice's current enforcement policy.
The Failure of the Webb-Pomerene Act
In 1918, Congress passed the Webb-Pomerene Act2 7 to remove the
uncertainty that already then existed about the application of the Sher-
man Act to export restraints having an effect on prices in U.S. markets
and causing no injury to domestic export competitors.2 8 The Webb-
Pomerene Act has provided a mechanism for reporting an export joint
venture among competitors where its purpose and effect is often to fix
the prices at which exported goods will be sold in foreign markets.
Such reported arrangements may not be challenged under the Sherman
Act.29 The House report accompanying the Webb-Pomerene Act ex-
plicitly disavowed any implication that the Sherman Act necessarily
applied to such export joint ventures if not registered as Webb-Pomer-
ene associations.3° It noted that "professional opinion" at the time was
divided on what the Sherman Act covered t.3  Congress evidently be-
lieved that the passage of the Webb-Pomerene Act would provide a
practical alleviation of exporter uncertainty. However, the Act has not
23 United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
24 Id. at 961.
25 Id. at 961-62.
26 Id. at 962.
27 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1973).
28 K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 352 (1958).
29 Id. at 105-06.
30 Id See H.R. REP. No. 50, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917).
31 BREWSTER, supra note 28, at 105-06.
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resolved, as it could not have, the more fundamental question of
whether the Sherman Act should apply to exports that have no effect
on domestic commerce.
The Webb-Pomerene Act has not been a great success over the
past 60 years.32 Few export joint venturers have relied upon it.
33
Moreover, it has the disadvantage of requiring public disclosure of ar-
rangements one might prefer not to advertise. Inevitably, it has failed
to resolve the uncertainty about the scope of the Sherman Act. One of
its failures was demonstrated by the Minnesota Mining Case which held
that a foreign joint venture could violate the Sherman Act even though
it had registered as a Webb-Pomerene association.34
Pending export trading company legislation laudably seeks to re-
move the uncertainty for exporters created by this open question about
the scope of the Sherman Act.35 However, like the Webb-Pomerene
Act which it amends and supplements, the proposed legislation seeks a
regulatory solution instead of clarifying the underlying antitrust statute
itself. While the certification of trading companies against private anti-
trust liability removes some uncertainty, the intrusion of an administra-
tive process with its regulations, technical procedures and executive
branch discretion can only add new uncertainty of its own.
Today, there is a growing rift between those who support vigorous
antitrust enforcement and those who seek to encourage American busi-
ness productivity and marketing, especially in export trade. This rift is
both unfortunate and unnecessary. Improved American production
and marketing success is compatible with and furthered by the promo-
tion of competition in the United States and world markets. A clarifi-
cation of the scope of the Sherman Act by the Commission can close
this rift without any compromise of either position.
Some may contend that specifying the limits of U.S. antitrust juris-
diction as to U.S. export trade will be seen as a weakening of the Amer-
ican commitment to competitive markets. On the contrary, the changes
proposed here would only clarify what has in fact been U.S. law for 90
years. Such a clarification would reflect a rational self-restraint and
32. See General Enforcement policy in International Trade, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST,
FIFTH ANNUAL FORDHAm CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 328 (1978) (panel discussion).
33 For a historical view, see FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ECONOMIC REPORT ON WEBB-
POMERENE ASSOCIATIONS: A 50 YEAR REVIEW (1967) (staff report). In 1976, only about 1
percent of all U.S. exports were attributable to export trade associations registered under Webb-
Pomerene Act. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, WEBB-POMERENE ASSOCIATIONS: TEN YEARS
LATER (1978) (staff report).
34 92 F. Supp. at 964.
35 See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
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would allow for the exercise of federal antitrust jurisdiction over only
those export-related activities that cause injury to persons within our
territory. Other nations, which fear our assertion of excessive antitrust
jurisdiction, would welcome a clear statement of our law. The U.S.,
and especially the Commission, should recognize that there are limits to
what U.S. law can accomplish by itself, and should acknowledge that if
we are to promote greater competitiveness in world markets, as indeed
we should, we must do it bilaterally and multilaterally, but not unilat-
erally.
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND
THE TRADE LAWS
There is an increasing perception of conflict between antitrust law
and policy, on the one hand, and trade law and policy, on the other.
The antitrust laws are hostile to international cartels. In certain limited
instances, U.S. trade law promotes international cartelization through
import limitations and orderly marketing agreements. Some suggest
that the antitrust laws discourage U.S. industries from legitimately ex-
ercising rights conferred under the trade law. Others claim that the
antitrust laws limit the ability of foreign industries to settle U.S. domes-
tic trade actions. How true are these assertions and what should be
done about the problems that generate them?
On the whole, U.S. trade law has been harmed by Congressional
mistrust of executive bureaucracy-mistrust both of the bureaucracy's
competence and of its motivation to reflect and be accountable to the
popular will. The salient fact about U.S. trade law is that it alone
among the trade regimes of our major trading partners does not permit
our Chief Executive to factor public, consumer, or national security in-
terest standards into relief determinations in the two vital trade areas of
dumping and subsidies. No other nation's executive policymakers, so
far as I have been able to determine, are similarly encumbered.
Limitations on Executive Branch authority in the most recent
trade statute are attributable, I suspect, to this longstanding tension be-
tween Congress and the President, as exacerbated by recent events
largely unrelated to any surge of protectionism. One such event is the
failure of the trade law process to dispose of the Japanese color TV
complaints36 for ten years after an affirmative dumping finding was
made.37 This heightened Congressional disillusionment with the moti-
36 Television Receiversfrom Japan, 36 Fed. Reg. 4597 (1971) (imposing antidumping duties).
37 For a complete account of the Japanese color TV case, see Multilateral Trade Negotiations.-
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Trade of the Senate Comm. on S.1376, 96th Cong.,
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vation and competence of executive bureaucrats.38 Instead, it should
have brought a reappraisal of the narrow, overly technical and inflexi-
ble approach of the trade law itself.
It is important for the Commission to consider ways of ameliorat-
ing potential conflict between antitrust and trade law enforcement.
One proposal that I would urge the Commission to consider is that
current dumping and subsidies liability standards be aligned with those
of our major trading partners. Additionally, the Commission should
consider making the dumping and subsidy laws accountable to a
broader and more relevant range of U.S. economic, political, and stra-
tegic interests. For instance, a modified trade law could deny relief
from foreign dumping to a domestic monopolist if such relief would
injure U.S. industries that purchase the monopolist's goods. If antitrust
concerns are imported into the trade law, the Justice Department may
discover that participation in the trade adjudication process is less nec-
essary. Business competitors will no longer be able to employ U.S.
trade laws to form "legal" international cartels that are harmful to U.S.
interests.
It may seem that the trade laws are beyond the bailiwick of the
Commission, but I believe that the Commission's mandate should be
interpreted to include an examination of those laws. If the Commis-
sion's purpose is to clarify the interrelationship between the antitrust
laws and the trade laws, it should not assume that the trade laws are
faultless, for this assumption could distort the Commission's recom-
mendations and limit their usefulness.
CONCLUSION
If a Presidential Commission were to focus dispassionately on
these issues, clarifying them and making realistic recommendations, its
creation would be more than justified.
It would be long overdue.
1st Sess. 207-09 (1979) (statement of John Nevin, Chairman, Zenith Radio Corp.). The original
complaint was filed in March 1968, but a dumping finding was not entered until March 1971.
After assessing a mere one million dollars in dumping duties in the years between 1971 and 1978,
the Customs Department discovered that its figures were erroneous, and it attempted to assess
another 400 million dollars of duties. The enormity of the sum raised an outcry from the Japanese
manufacturers, so the Treasury Department sought a settlement. The negotiations took several
months, and gleaned only one-eighth of the duties owing. Id.
38 See, e.g., the restrictive new antidumping procedures created by the Trade Agreements Act
of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, §§ 731-36 (1979) (codified in scattered sections of 13, 19,
26, 28 U.S.C.), and the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974) (codified in
scattered sections of 5-8, 15, 19, 2 1-22, 26, 42, 45 U.S.C.). See generally Comment, The New Anti-
Dumping Procedures of the TradeAgreementsAct of 1979: Does It Create a New Non-Tariff Trade
Barrier?, 2 Nw. J. INTL L. 200 (1980).
